

file 005

PH = PHayer  
mwh/meha

Annex E

Fleet

Concept of operations: Purpose of Annex is to provide Pacific Fleet Commanders with information required for formulation of supporting plans and for the exercise of command initiative in situations where recourse to higher authority may be physically impossible of execution or incompatible with the existing situation...A temporary partial or complete loss of communications capability is a possible consequence of the use of nuclear weapons. Loss of comm. could occur prior to the formal execution of the general emergency operations plans. To provide for the contingency wherein loss of command communications capability occurs, general emergency op. plans must be developed in adequate detail to be capable of implementation with minimum communications.

...All defensive tasks are to be executed in the event of a surprise attack or upon receipt of a tactical warning from a reliable source that indicates that an enemy attack has been launched, is under way, or has occurred. Prepare to accomplish all other tasks. ...It is not expected that an attack will completely deny for an extended period, the means for communicating the authority to initiate an all-out attack on the enemy. Therefore, Annex E will not be executed until specific authority for its implementation has been received.

Summary of JSCP objectives; including specifically deterrence of China.

Limited war may cause deployment bad for general war. Hence, intelligence needed to permit timely redeployment.

Emphasis on spectrum of actions, plans.

Enemy air delivery targets first priority; subs next.

Marines: 2 squadrons (40 AG) on Japan. List of CINCPAC atomic capable forces.

Atomic ops will be conducted and controlled by CINCPAC through the component commanders, except when operational control of atomic capable forces is passed to joint task force commanders or exercised under the direction of subordinate unified commanders.

In the early stages of general war, atomic coordination procedures may fail because of disrupted communications. The Fleet Commander who has access to atomic weapons sub-allocated to him will destroy targets as required by this Plan despite the lack of communications and subject to the receipt of authentic indication that the President has authorized the employment of atomic weapons.

CSC will exercise sufficient control of weapons expenditures to:

- 1) provide a ready accounting to the CSC for all atomic weapons allocated, including:
  - a) weapons remaining available.
  - b) weapons expended
  - c) purpose for which expended.
- 2) Minimize interference between atomic delivery forces.
- 3) Achieve maximum military effort in the delivery of atomic weapons.
- 4) Minimize overbombing, insure appropriate atomic targets are not overlooked and that ineffective action is not taken by one force through ignorance of the actions of another.
- 5) That appropriate forces having delivery capability and atomic weapons are promptly available to and in support of commanders as specified by the CSC.

To achieve a minimum response time would inevitably result in ~~loss of~~ denial of mobility and would require continuous operations in areas of high search and attack density. To insure that the PacFlt forces have the highest 'survival quotient' and probability of response to attack, the fleet must maximize its mobility and flexibility.

Weapons assigned but not suballocated may not be expended until authorized by CINCPACFLT; except when subordinate commanders are unable to communicate with him or higher

same  
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Weapons assigned but not suballocated may not be expended until authorized by Cincpacflt; except when subordinate commanders are unable to communicate with him or higher authority or when comm. delays are unacceptable. Then, having received authority to expend weapons, commanders may use reserves as required.

It is recognized that a disaster could occur which would disrupt normal operational and command channels...thus precluding the transmission of notification and weapon release instructions to affect implementation of emergency war plans....Should the time come when it is apparent to a commander that he must proceed on his own initiative, he must take such courses of action, based on the info at his disposal, as appears to best suit the national interest. Prior planning, a complete understanding of his mission, and common sense are the considerations that a commander must consider in reaching his decision.

PH  
dc'ation



Primary emphasis placed on planning for contingency: SU surprise attack. Initial phase of operations will be decisive; will determine ultimate outcome. For planning purposes, initial phase is considered to extend from D-day through the first month.

In event of a surprise attack when US and allied forces do not have the initiative, attack activity will be directed to striking targets that will cause maximum disruption; government and military control centers, population centers, communications centers, neutralization of skilled labor and high priority nuclear weapon delivery capability. When US and allied forces have strategic warning, activity will be directed to the elimination of Soviet long-range nuclear weapon delivery capability, attainment of air superiority, containment of Soviet air-ground offensives, destruction of Soviet war sustaining facilities, and isolation and elimination of deployed Soviet and Satellite military forces.

Unfavorable and most probable condition is Tactical Warning: no knowledge of impending attack prior to enemy penetration of friendly early warning radar. Strategic Warning: optimum condition when pre-DaDay mobilization occurs as a result of increased world tension and local hostilities and sufficient warning is received to carry out required ~~planned~~ pre-strike operations; could be degraded to a maximum of four hours.

Priorities of targets under Tactical Warning will be planned to cause max disruption: alternative undertakings.

SU-FE: 15 heavy bombers, 189 mediums (Bison, Badger); some Bu ls. 12 primary bomber bases, 22 alternate bomber bases. 450,000 troops

CCAF: 20 Bu ls, 400 Beagles. 2 primary bomber bases, 16 alternate bomber bases.

Recon missions planned to accomplish strike evaluation within 15 minutes--3 hours after strike.

5th AF: maintain capability to commence launch of atomic forces in Japan within one hour of receipt of complete nuclear weapons.

315th Air Division: maintain sufficient aircraft on a continuous 30-minute departure alert at Kadena and Central AB, loaded with weapons and/or nuclear capsules for delivery of first wave requirements to bases in Japan.

Quick Strike concept is primarily designed to meet requirements of alternative undertakings. (these call for neutralization of atomic delivery capability where possible).

Objective for Tactical Warning: 70% of all possesses aircraft on strike sorties within 4 hours. (alert within 15 minutes).

Def. of tactical warning: the type of warning that may be received from the moment of actual launch of enemy aircraft and missiles with the intent to attack the US or her allies until the time that enemy weapons begin to detonate on targets within the US or other friendly territories. ...may occur in an atmosphere of complete surprise (without any previously recognized strategic warning) or after a period of recognized strategic warning.

Basic or standard strike plan for PACAR forces will be termed NORMAL and will provide for execution of general war under tactical warning, no notice conditions, against alternative undertaking targets. Targets from alternative undertaking list and primary undertaking list.

length of war

idea of pre-strike

SU-FE  
Sov = 34  
Siles  
CH = + 13 sides

China  
Comm  
Air F.

Launch from 1st hour

Okinawa



Satellite military forces.

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Basic or standard strike plan for PACAF forces will be termed NREFMAL and will provide for execution of general war under tactical warning, no notice conditions, against alternative undertaking targets. Targets from alternative undertaking list and primary undertaking list.

Variation: a) Primary strike plan: against primary undertakings only. Retarget planes whose alternative undertaking targets are not primary targets.  
b) Deployed strike plan: in case sufficient warning is available to preposition forces to forward operating areas to enhance strike profiles. Altern and primary.  
c) Deployed-Primary strike plan.

48 B-57s on Johnson AFB; 225 F-100s on Itazuki, Misawa, Kadena, Clark; missiles on Tainan, Korea.

DEFCON 5, 4, 3: be able to launch all operationally ready aircraft on strike sorties within 6 hours.

Defcon 2: Deploy strike forces when directed; man PACAF advance hg. at Kunia; augment POLO; increase number of aircraft on Quick Strike to 1/3 of possessed force; load up available weapons; 80% of aircraft operationally ready; be able to launch all these within two hours.

DEFCON 1: Execute weapons movement schedules, on order; increase Quick Strike to 1/2 of force; prepare in Japan; be able to launch all operationally ready within 30 minutes

3  
varied

US  
force  
M

Kunia  
M

Japan  
Defcon  
M



Spark Plug procedures are only method by which Quick Strike forces may initially be launched or initially directed to expend. They provide for automatic launch of High Gear force whenever launch of the QS force is directed, but are not the only way the HG force may be launched.

"Launch": take off, proceed to preplanned orbit points and await instructions; if authentic expend message does not arrive prior to fuel decision time (interrogate ground station, then) return to take off base or other point as directed.

High Gear launch: execute weapons delivery.

Presidential authority to use atomic weapons is implicit in an authenticated CINCPAC EAF C-4 message, and in an authentic Spark Plug expend message. On receipt of former, Commander Fifth AF and 13th AF will issue expend messages, and Com 5th AF will launch HG.

Also, these two can launch their forces as a precautionary measure under circumstances where attack appears beyond a reasonable doubt to be imminent or underway. Subordinate commanders can also do this, only provided that communications with the appropriate numbered AF commander are lost.

Double envelope: 1) outside tells series. 2) if message gives correct series, open envelope; face of inner envelope gives first two phonetic code letters; if these correspond to first two letters in message, "Launch"; if message is received (then or later) containing four letters, first two of which correspond to those on face of inner envelope, open inner envelope; if card inside has all four letters, "Expend" weapons on assigned target.

Several series of envelopes are issued; series in effect will be changed at random intervals by Hq PACAF.

Where feasible, and in order to reduce probability of inadvertent or unauthorized act, envelope should be opened while in the presence of at least one other person who is knowledgeable to Spark Plug procedures (cannot be applied to airborne bomb commanders). If the envelope is to be opened in response to a Spark Plug communication, the message should be known to both parties before the envelope is unsealed. Verification against envelope contents should be accomplished jointly.

Messages will identify the undertaking (primary or alternative) in clear text. If undertaking is not known, authority directing the action will assume the alternative undertaking applies and direct forces accordingly. Once the undertaking is specified there will be no subsequent change.

Duty officers receiving C-4 message, authenticate it, issue appropriate SP ~~xx~~ message, call subordinate units by most expeditious voice circuit and repeat same SP message, dispatch PACAF EWP ~~xx~~ execute on order. (in "launch only" situation, announce DEFCON 1). Notify appropriate commanding officer.

If PACAF sends SP expend message, it will follow shortly by EWP execution order. If 5th AF or 13th AF received authentic SP expend message, they will issue EWP execute. If PACAF or others issue SP launch only message, they will follow ~~xxx~~ with DEFCON 1.

Messages are sent unclassified on UHF from operations facilities, air defense sites and control towers. (Crew may request message via UHF from these facilities). Crew monitors specified frequency throughout flight.

On receipt of message, facilities will transmit message in clear immediately and at designated time intervals for one hour, unless directed to stop.  
((WILL PILOTS TRANSMIT MESSAGE TO EACH OTHER?))